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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge: 
 
American Premier Underwriters, Inc.1  appeals the entry of 
a consent decree that resolves the liability of Consolidated 
Rail Corporation (Conrail), National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak), and Southeastern Pennsylvania 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. American Premier Underwriters, Inc. was previously called The Penn 
Central Corporation. The Penn Central Corporation ar ose out of the 
reorganization of Penn Central Transportation Company. For 
convenience, we will refer to all three entities as American Premier. 
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Transportation Authority (SEPTA) for environmental 
contamination at the Paoli Rail Yard Site2 in Paoli, 
Pennsylvania. American Premier, a non-settling defendant, 
argues that the decree unfairly allocates responsibility for 
cleanup at the Site and that the contribution pr otection it 
provides to the settling parties is not per mitted under the 
relevant statute. We affirm. 
 
Operations that involved the service, repair , and storage 
of rail cars were conducted at Paoli Rail Y ard from 1915 
until the beginning of 1995. In the 1950s, electric rail cars 
that used dielectric fluid to cool their transfor mers were 
first stored and maintained at the yar d. Dielectric fluid 
contains polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). PCBs, which 
pose substantial risks to human health and the 
environment, are released during the servicing of train 
transformers and volatilize if overheated during train 
operation. Operations at the yard allegedly caused PCB 
contamination throughout the rail yard pr operty. The 
contamination eventually spread to other nearby properties 
through erosion. 
 
From 1915 until 1976, American Premier and its 
predecessors owned and operated the rail yar d. Pursuant to 
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, American 
Premier conveyed the yard to Conrail on April 1, 1976. That 
same day, Conrail conveyed the yard to Amtrak. Amtrak 
still owns the property. Conrail operated the yard from April 
1, 1976 until the end of 1982. SEPTA then took over the 
yard's operation, using it to maintain commuter trains from 
1983 until January 1995, when it moved its maintenance 
operations to a different location. SEPT A gradually phased 
out the use of dielectric fluid that contained PCBs, ending 
its use in 1986. 
 
In 1985, EPA representatives observed that access to the 
rail yard was unrestricted and that people walked through 
and children played in areas at and near the rail yard. They 
also saw signs of erosion indicating water runoff from the 
yard into nearby residential areas. Sampling revealed PCB 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Site includes the 28-acre rail yar d property and the surrounding 
400-acre watershed. 
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contamination in the rail yard and residential soils and in 
the fish in nearby creeks. 
 
The following year, the United States br ought this action 
against SEPTA, Conrail, and Amtrak (collectively, the rail 
companies) pursuant to, inter alia, sections 104, 106(a), 
and 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 
SS 9604, 9606(a), and 9607. The gover nment sought 
injunctive relief and reimbursement of r esponse costs in 
connection with the release of PCBs at the Site. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania intervened as a plaintiff 
later that year.3 
 
In June 1986, the United States, Conrail, and SEPT A 
petitioned the district court that had overseen American 
Premier's bankruptcy reorganization to establish their right 
to proceed against American Premier . See In re Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 1991). American 
Premier's argument that the earlier r eorganization 
discharged the CERCLA claims was ultimately 
unsuccessful. See id. at 168. In 1992, the United States 
filed a separate action against American Pr emier, and the 
rail companies brought American Premier into this action 
as a third-party defendant. American Pr emier then sought 
a declaratory judgment that the government's claims were 
barred by a 1980 settlement agreement that resolved claims 
between American Premier and the United States arising 
from the valuation of American Premier's rail assets 
conveyed pursuant to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act. 
See Penn Cent. Corp. v. United States, 862 F . Supp. 437, 
448-58 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1994). The court granted 
summary judgment to the government on this issue. See id. 
at 458. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1979, Pennsylvania's Department of Envir onmental Resources 
determined that portions of the Site wer e contaminated. The 
Commonwealth issued an administrative order to the rail companies, 
requiring them to implement immediate stop-gap measures, assess the 
contamination, and begin cleanup. The rail companies appealed this 
order to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board. The appeal was 
stayed and eventually transferred to the district court (via a 1990 
stipulation) as part of this litigation. 
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Since the government initiated this action, it has entered 
into five partial preliminary consent decr ees with the rail 
companies under which they agreed to per form a variety of 
remedies at the Site. In 1986, SEPTA agr eed to construct a 
combination fence that restricted access to the rail yard 
and limited further PCB migration into the ar ea 
surrounding the yard. Later that year , all three rail 
companies agreed to conduct an engineering study 
addressing erosion and PCB migration fr om the rail yard 
and identifying possible remedies to limit the spread of 
PCBs. A dispute arose between the United States and the 
rail companies over the work necessary to implement the 
study, and EPA ended up constructing sedimentation 
basins and erosion control systems and r emoving and 
disposing of contaminated soil from several r esidential 
properties. Under the third partial pr eliminary consent 
decree, the rail companies conducted a r emedial 
investigation to determine the extent of PCB contamination 
at the Site and a feasibility study of various r emedial 
alternatives. As part of this decree, SEPTA entered into a 
stipulation that addressed worker protection at the rail 
yard and decontamination of the car shop, a building in 
which rail cars had been repaired since 1915. Under the 
fourth partial preliminary consent decr ee, the rail 
companies agreed to conduct a soil sampling pr ogram to 
determine the extent of PCB contamination in the 
residential areas and the surface water channels north of 
the rail yard. Finally, under the last partial decree, the rail 
companies excavated approximately 3500 cubic yards of 
contaminated soils from the residential ar ea north of the 
yard. All told, the rail companies spent appr oximately $12 
million on remedial action related to the Site before 
entering into the consent decree that is the subject of this 
appeal. 
 
EPA placed the Paoli Rail Yard Site on the National 
Priorities List in 1990. In July 1992, EPA issued a Record 
of Decision that reviewed remedial alter natives and their 
projected costs and selected remedies for the Site. As 
modified, the Record of Decision requir es: (1) excavation 
and on-site treatment of contaminated rail yar d soils 
(estimated cost: $19,507,375), (2) groundwater treatment 
and fuel oil recovery (estimated cost: $1,131,120), (3) 
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decontamination and demolition of rail yard buildings and 
structures (estimated cost: $1,471,905), (4) excavation of 
contaminated residential soils (estimated cost: $1,196,000), 
and (5) excavation of contaminated stream sediments 
(estimated cost: $5,701,720). 
 
In 1995, EPA proposed a consent decr ee that would 
require all four defendants to clean up the rail yard by 
carrying out the first three remedies fr om the Record of 
Decision, while leaving American Premier r esponsible for 
cleaning up the watershed by carrying out the last two 
remedies. 
 
In February 1996, American Premier offer ed to pay 20% 
of past and future remediation costs at the Site as part of 
a global settlement. American Premier told the rail 
companies not to view the proposal as a typical"opening 
bid," thus intimating that it would not be willing to increase 
its settlement offer. The rail companies responded that they 
were disappointed with the offer and that they believed that 
American Premier had "sorely misjudged" the probable 
outcome if the parties were to litigate. The United States 
was similarly unsatisfied with the offer . 
 
On September 30, 1996, EPA issued a unilateral 
administrative order requiring American Pr emier to 
implement the remedies from the Recor d of Decision related 
to the watershed portion of the Site. Under this or der, 
American Premier is responsible for the excavation of 
residential soils and stream sediments. T ogether, these 
remedies are estimated to cost $6,897,720. 
 
On July 28, 1997, the United States filed a Praecipe to 
Lodge Consent Decree, with the proposed decree resolving 
the rail companies' liability to the United States and the 
Commonwealth for contamination at the Site. The consent 
decree contends "that the degree of involvement by 
American Premier . . . in the disposal of hazar dous 
substances and the operation at the Site is at least equal to 
or maybe greater than the degree of involvement by all the 
Settling parties combined." It requir es the rail companies to 
excavate and contain the rail yard soils, per form the 
groundwater treatment and fuel oil r ecovery, and 
decontaminate and demolish rail yard buildings and 
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structures. Together, these r emedies are estimated to cost 
$22,110,400. The decree also requir es several payments by 
the rail companies: $500,000 to the EPA Hazar dous 
Substance Superfund to reimburse past r esponse costs, 
$100,000 to the Commonwealth to reimburse past response 
costs, and $850,000 for natural resource damages. 
 
The decree gives contribution protection to the rail 
companies for the past, interim, and future r esponse costs 
of the United States and the Commonwealth and for 
natural resource damages. It also gives them protection for 
all remedial actions they have perfor med or will perform at 
the Site, as well as for the work that American Pr emier is 
to perform under the administrative or der. 
 
American Premier objected to the proposed settlement by 
submitting comments both to EPA and to the 
Commonwealth. On July 30, 1998, the United States 
moved for entry of the consent decree. American Premier 
opposed the motion. The district court granted the motion 
after finding the consent decree procedurally and 
substantively fair, reasonable, and consistent with 
CERCLA's goals. This appeal followed. 
 
American Premier challenges the entry of the consent 
decree on two related grounds. First, it argues that 
CERCLA does not authorize the contribution pr otection 
provided to the rail companies by the decr ee. Second, it 
argues that the district court erred by approving the 
consent decree because the decree is substantively unfair. 
 
I. 
 
We review a district court's decision to grant a motion for 
entry of a consent decree for abuse of discr etion. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F .2d 79, 84 (1st 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Montr ose Chem. Corp., 50 F.3d 
741, 746 (9th Cir. 1995). "We appr oach our task mindful 
that, on appeal, a district court's approval of a consent 
decree in CERCLA litigation is encased in a double layer of 
swaddling." Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84. The first layer is the 
deference the district court owes to EP A's expertise and to 
the law's policy of encouraging settlement; the second layer 
is the deference we owe to the district court's discretion. 
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See id. Thus, American Premier is faced with a "heavy 
burden" in its attempt to persuade us that the district court 
abused its discretion by approving the consent decree. See 
id. 
 
American Premier's argument that CERCLA does not 
authorize the type of contribution protection granted by the 
consent decree raises an issue of law, and we exercise 
plenary review of the district court's decision on this issue. 
See New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp. , 111 F.3d 
1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
The district court held that the contribution pr otection 
provided by the consent decree is per missible under 
CERCLA. Under 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f)(2), "[a] person who has 
resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be 
liable for claims for contribution regar ding matters 
addressed in the settlement." 
 
Here, the consent decree defines "matters addressed" as 
 
       all claims asserted by the United States and the 
       Commonwealth in their respective complaints and all 
       claims of the United States and the Commonwealth 
       against the Settling Defendants for recovery of"Past 
       Response Costs", "Interim Response Costs","Future 
       Response Costs," and "Natural Resource Damages" as 
       those terms are defined in this Consent Decree, and all 
       claims of the United States and the Commonwealth for 
       all the costs of all past response actions per formed by 
       the Settling Defendants, the costs of, or per formance 
       of, the "Work" as that term is defined in this Consent 
       Decree, and the cost or performance of all Work to 
       implement that portion of the ROD [Record of Decision] 
       which Settling Defendants are not being r equired to 
       implement under this Consent Decree excluding those 
       items covered under the reservation of rights and 
       reopener provisions of Section XXII. 
 
American Premier claims that CERCLA does not authorize 
the contribution protection provided by the decree. The 
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problem, according to American Premier, is that the decree 
gives the rail companies contribution protection for the 
remedies that they will perform under the decree (which are 
matters addressed in the settlement) and for the remedies 
that American Premier will perfor m under the 
administrative order (which are not matters addressed in 
the settlement). In its view, this is a partial settlement, and 
the rail companies are only entitled to contribution 
protection for the remedies they ar e undertaking under the 
consent decree. 
 
We reject American Premier's view. While legislative 
history indicates that "Congress contemplated that there 
would be partial settlements which would leave settling 
parties liable for matters not addressed in the agreement," 
United States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F .3d 510, 515 (1st 
Cir. 1996), this is not a partial settlement. The Paoli Site 
does contain two distinct areas: the rail yar d and the 
watershed. Under the settlement, the rail companies are 
responsible for cleaning up the rail yar d. CERCLA does not 
require, however, that the matters addressed in the decree 
be limited to the rail yard. 
 
The decree states that the United States and the rail 
companies "wish to finally conclude . . . all claims and 
causes of action set forth" in this litigation. This litigation 
relates to contamination of the entire Paoli Site. The rail 
companies agreed to take on the remedies necessary to 
clean up the rail yard in order to r esolve their liability for 
contamination throughout the Site. Reading this settlement 
as a whole, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
matters it addresses are matters r elated to the entire Site, 
even without an explicit definition of matters addressed. 
See John M. Hyson, CERCLA Settlements, Contribution 
Protection and Fairness to Non-Settling Responsible Parties, 
10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 277, 320 (1999) ("[I]n light of Congress's 
intent to induce settlements, all settlement[s] should be 
presumed to afford to the settlors protection against claims 
for contribution regarding an entir e site, unless there is an 
explicit provision to the contrary."); see also Akzo Coatings, 
Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 771-74 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, including a definition of matters addressed 
in the decree will foreclose futur e arguments over the scope 
of the contribution protection.4 See Charter Int'l, 83 F.3d at 
517 n.9; Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 768 & n.14. The 
definition of matters addressed in this decr ee clarifies the 
extent of the contribution protection that the rail 
companies are receiving in exchange for their agreement to 
clean up the rail yard property, r eimburse the United 
States and the Commonwealth for part of their r esponse 
costs, and pay for a portion of natural resour ce damages. 
The district court did not err by holding the contribution 
protection provided by the decree per missible under 
CERCLA. 
 
III. 
 
American Premier's second argument is that the district 
court should not have granted the motion to enter the 
consent decree because the decree is substantively unfair. 
A court should approve a proposed consent decree if it is 
fair, reasonable, and consistent with CERCLA's goals. See 
United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F .2d 79, 85 (1st 
Cir. 1990). The terms of a decr ee are substantively fair if 
they are based on comparative fault and if liability is 
apportioned according to rational estimates of the harm 
each party has caused. See id. at 87. 
 
According to American Premier, the court erred in three 
different ways: (1) by adopting a method of allocating 
responsibility based on years of ownership and operation, 
(2) by approving a decree that sets a minimum amount of 
liability for American Premier while setting a maximum 
amount of liability for the rail companies, prior to an 
allocation proceeding, and (3) by approving a decree that 
immunizes the rail companies from sharing liability for 
uncertain future costs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While it is possible that the breadth of a matters addressed provision 
could render a consent decree unfair , that is not this case. See infra, 
Section III. 
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A. 
 
As long as the measure of comparative fault on which the 
settlement terms are based is not "arbitrary, capricious, 
and devoid of a rational basis," the district court should 
uphold it. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 87. According to the 
decree, American Premier's responsibility for contamination 
at the Site is at least equal to and possibly gr eater than the 
responsibility of the rail companies combined. The district 
court accepted as fair the decree's apportionment of liability 
based on years of ownership of the Paoli Rail Y ard and the 
likelihood of contamination during those years. 
 
PCBs were used at the rail yard for at least twenty-five 
years while American Premier owned and operated the 
yard. Amtrak owned the yard for ten years while PCBs were 
used. During that ten-year period, first Conrail and then 
SEPTA operated the yard. Therefor e, American Premier 
owned and operated the rail yard more than 70% of the 
time while PCBs were used. 
 
American Premier argues that the district court "wholly 
disregarded" its settlement proposal, which was based on 
factors other than years of ownership, to assume 20% of 
the past and future costs of remediation at the Site. But the 
district court was not required to accept American 
Premier's methodology for apportioning liability. Once it 
found that the decree was based on a rational 
determination of comparative fault, its task was complete, 
whether or not it would have employed the same method of 
apportionment. See id. at 88. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by accepting years of ownership and 
operation as a plausible method on which to judge the 
fairness of the consent decree. 
 
B. 
 
American Premier contends that the decr ee is unfair 
because it sets a minimum level of responsibility for 
American Premier by foreclosing it fr om receiving 
contribution from the rail companies for its costs, while 
setting a maximum level of responsibility for the rail 
companies by leaving them free to bring a contribution 
action against American Premier. This disparity does not 
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establish that the decree is substantively unfair or that the 
district court abused its discretion by entering it. 
 
Taking into account American Premier's share of Site 
remediation and assuming that it will have to r eimburse 
the United States and the Commonwealth for the r emainder 
of their past response costs and pay natural r esource 
damages, American Premier will be responsible for costs 
that exceed $17 million. Eventually, the total amount 
expended on Site remediation and damages, including the 
$12 million already spent by the rail companies, will likely 
exceed $53 million. Because of the contribution pr otection 
provided to the rail companies, American Pr emier's 
minimum share of these costs is 33%. Its shar e may 
increase if the rail companies bring a successful 
contribution action against it. 
 
American Premier's offer to assume r esponsibility for 20% 
of the costs was unacceptable to EPA and the rail 
companies, so they chose to settle without American 
Premier. The settlement reduces the rail companies' 
maximum share of liability from 100% to 67% in exchange 
for their agreement to clean up the rail yar d and pay part 
of past response costs and natural resour ce damages: 
 
       In most instances, settlement requires compromise. 
       Thus, it makes sense for the government, when 
       negotiating, to give a PRP [potentially r esponsible party] 
       a discount on its maximum potential liability as an 
       incentive to settle. Indeed, the statutory scheme 
       contemplates that those who are slow to settle ought to 
       bear the risk of paying more . . . . 
 
United States v. DiBiase, 45 F.3d 541, 546 (1st Cir. 1995). 
The rail companies' share of liability may decr ease if they 
bring a successful contribution action against American 
Premier. 
 
We recently pointed out that the "intended effect" of 
protecting settling parties from contribution claims "is that 
`non-settling defendants may bear disproportionate liability 
for their acts.' " United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 
200 F.3d 143, 150 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting B. F. Goodrich 
v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 527 (2d Cir . 1996)). In Occidental 
Chemical, EPA had already settled with one potentially 
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responsible party when it issued an administrative order to 
Occidental, requiring it to participate in the cleanup. See id. 
at 145. Occidental pointed out that, because the other 
party obtained contribution protection for matters 
addressed in the settlement, Occidental could end up 
paying more than its fair share. See id. at 150 n.8. We 
responded, "While this is true, it is the r esult of a deliberate 
policy choice made by Congress in order to encourage 
settlements." Id. 
 
It is highly unlikely that this consent decr ee will result in 
a final allocation of responsibility for contamination at the 
Paoli Site. The rail companies will be able to bring a 
contribution action against American Premier and will be 
able to offer more specific evidence r egarding the relative 
fault of the parties. The district court will then be able to 
determine whether American Premier is liable for a portion 
of the rail companies' costs. If the court chooses to do so, 
it will be able to take into account the costs incurred by 
American Premier which are not recoverable through 
contribution. See 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f)(1) (in a contribution 
action, "the court may allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such equitable factors as the court 
determines are appropriate"). 
 
This consent decree does set a floor for American 
Premier's liability while setting a ceiling for the rail 
companies' liability. That is part of the scheme enacted by 
Congress, and the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by rejecting the argument that this r esult made the decree 
unfair. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, American Premier argues that the consent decree 
is unfair because it alone will be responsible for "highly 
speculative" future costs: those related to its share of Site 
remediation, natural resource damages, and future 
response costs of the United States and the 
Commonwealth. This, too, is an argument based on the 
contribution protection provided to the rail companies. 
 
In every case where remedial measur es have yet to be 
performed, the future costs ar e uncertain. But that 
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uncertainty should not be used to hinder settlement. EPA 
used standard methodologies to estimate the costs of 
cleaning up the Site, and neither we nor the district court 
are in a position to second-guess these estimates. See 
Cannons, 899 F.2d at 90 ("If the figures relied upon derive 
in a sensible way from a plausible interpr etation of the 
record, the court should normally defer to the agency's 
expertise."). The natural resource damages estimate was 
based on detailed assessments, and if these damages turn 
out to be "significantly greater" than the $5.3 million 
estimate, the consent decree does not pr event EPA from 
pursuing the rail companies for the excess. Finally, we 
doubt that the United States and the Commonwealth will 
incur much in the way of future response costs since the 
consent decree, along with the administrative order, will 
result in a complete remedy at the Paoli Rail Yard Site. 
 
Whenever a non-settling party is barred fr om bringing a 
contribution action and work remains to be done, its future 
liability may exceed present estimates. The district court 
determined that this possibility did not r ender the consent 
decree unfair, and we see no abuse of discretion in that 
determination. 
 
*   *   * 
 
We affirm the entry of the consent decree. 
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